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Abstract	
Important	changes	in	the	legal	regulation	of	the	fine	culminated	in	the	implementation	of	the	
day‐fine	 system	 in	many	 European	 countries	 during	 the	 twentieth	 century.	 These	 changes	
resulted	 from	 various	 late	 nineteenth	 century	 rationalities	 that	 considered	 the	 fine	 a	
justifiable	 punishment.	 Therefore,	 they	 supported	 extending	 its	 application	 by	 making	 it	
affordable	 for	 people	 on	 low	 incomes,	 which	 meant	 imprisonment	 for	 fine	 default	 could	
mostly	be	avoided	without	undermining	 the	end	of	punishment.	 In	 this	paper	 I	 investigate	
the	historical	development	of	the	penal	fine	as	well	as	the	changing	forms	of	this	penalty	in	
Western	 European	 criminal	 systems	 from	 the	 end	 of	 the	 eighteenth	 century	 until	 the	 late	
nineteenth	century.	
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Introduction	
One	of	the	considerations	of	a	legal	nature	with	greater	influence	on	the	courts’	attitude	towards	
penal	fines	is	the	changeable	legal	regulation	in	order	to	make	them	affordable	for	persons	on	
low	 incomes.	 In	 fact,	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 day‐fine	 system	 in	many	 European	 countries	
was	 the	 effect	 of	 various	 late	 nineteenth	 century	 rationalities	 that	 considered	 the	 fine	 a	
justifiable	punishment.	Therefore,	these	rationalities	tried	to	support	its	extension	by	making	it	
affordable,	which	meant	that	offenders	could	mostly	avoid	imprisonment	for	fine	default.	This	
paper	investigates	the	historical	development	of	the	penal	fine	and	factors	that	have	influenced	
the	changing	forms	of	this	penalty	in	Western	European	criminal	systems1	from	the	end	of	the	
eighteenth	 century	 until	 the	 late	 nineteenth	 century.	 Understanding	 change	 or	 innovation	 in	
penal	 law	should	involve	a	historically	 informed	appreciation	of	 the	situation	and	of	the	often	
conflicting	 pressures	 which	 confront	 scholars,	 thinkers	 and	 policy‐makers.	 Accordingly,	 I	
explain	why	the	problem	of	achieving	equality	of	punishment	impact	between	offenders	arose.	
Additionally,	 I	 investigate	 how	 criticism	 of	 the	 disastrous	 effects	 of	 short‐term	 imprisonment	
advanced	the	day‐fine	as	a	way	to	overcome	the	perceived	inequality	of	monetary	punishments.	
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The	liberal	approach	to	fines	
The	 fine	was	 a	 very	 important	 sanction	 in	most	 European	 countries	 until	 the	 late	 eighteenth	
century	 (see	 for	England,	Briggs	et	 al.	 1996	and	Sharpe	1990:	20‐25;	 for	Germany,	Neumaier	
1947;	for	Spain,	Roldán	Barbero	1988:	176;	for	Italy,	Cecchini	1991:	282	ff).	As	O’Malley	(2009:	
70)	explains,	 ‘…	 [i]t	was	not	 simply	 corporal	punishment	 that	prisons	displaced,	but	 also	and	
even	more	so,	fines’.	
	
The	use	of	fines	as	a	punishment,	however,	was	almost	abandoned.	This	shift	away	from	the	fine	
occurred,	 firstly,	 because	 the	 penalty	 of	 imprisonment	 was	 regarded	 as	 a	 more	 equal	
punishment	 than	the	 fine	due	 to	 the	way,	 from	the	end	of	 the	eighteenth	century,	 that	 liberty	
was	regarded.	Liberty	was	something	that,	in	the	main,	every	person	should	possess	in	the	same	
amount.	 Under	 the	 banner	 of	 equality	 under	 the	 law,	 which	 meant	 eliminating	 any	 formal	
discrimination	in	the	way	sanctions	were	handed	out,	legislative	parity	was	centred	on	the	value	
of	 ‘freedom’.	Equality	issues	associated	with	using	imprisonment	for	punishment	did	not	stem	
from	dissention	about	 rights	 to	 liberty	 in	which	 all	 individuals	were	presumed	equal.	Rather,	
concerns	 about	 equality	 were	 in	 response	 to	 the	 examination	 of	 incarceration	 rates	 which	
revealed	that	the	probability	of	imprisonment	was	linked	to	an	individual’s	social	class,	race	and	
income	level.		
	
The	original	attitude	towards	fines	was	very	different.	In	fact,	 it	was	the	reverse	of	that	which	
was	 presumed	 for	 the	 use	 of	 imprisonment	 (Young	 1989:	 63).	 Nobody	 presumes	 that	
individuals	 are	 in	 equal	 positions	 as	 regards	 to	 money.	 Tariff	 and	 fixed‐fine	 systems	 were	
adopted	by	the	first	criminal	codes	as	a	way	of	 limiting	the	arbitrariness	 in	the	assessment	of	
fines.	They	were	based	upon	understandings	that	the	same	or	similar	amounts	of	money	should	
be	imposed	on	all	defendants	coming	before	the	court	convicted	of	a	particular	offence.	But	the	
result	 of	 such	 fines	 was,	 eventually,	 the	 lack	 of	 deterrence	 for	 the	 richer	 offenders2	 and	 the	
insolvency	 of	 the	 less	 affluent	 ones.	 Soon	 it	was	 observed	 that	 punishing	 an	 offence	with	 the	
imposition	of	a	fine	for	a	specific	amount	generally	led	to	the	legal	imposition	of	inequality	(in	
Italy,	Filangieri	1788:	Book	 III,	 second	part,	Chapter	XXXII;	 in	Germany,	 von	Feuerbach	1804:	
228;	 in	Spain,	Marcos	Gutiérrez	1826	III:	145‐147),	unless	the	quantum	of	the	 fine	was	 left	 to	
the	 discretion	 of	 the	 judges,	 which	 was	 considered	 ‘seemingly	 repugnant	 to	 the	 genius	 of	 a	
government,	 formed	and	supported	on	maxims	of	 freedom’	 (Eden	1771:	68).	Fines	did	not	sit	
well	with	 the	 formal	understanding	of	 the	principle	of	equality.	 In	 fact,	 for	 a	 large	part	of	 the	
literature	of	the	early‐	and	mid‐nineteenth	century,	it	seemed	quite	obvious	that	the	fine	could	
not	be	considered	a	‘fair’	punishment	at	all:	
	
The	fine	is	a	punishment	of	a	singular	kind,	and	has	little	in	common	with	most	
other	punishments	established	by	law.	While	these	cases	encumber	the	person	or	
freedom,	 which	 is	 almost	 the	 same	 person,	 those	 affect	 wealth	 only,	 which	 is	
something	 very	 different.	 The	 level	 of	 personality	 is	 the	 same	 for	 all	men,	 and	
freedom	 is	 similar:	 wealth	 is	 so	 varied,	 men’s	 fortunes	 are	 so	 disparate	 and	
diverse	 …	 Therefore,	 if	 a	 personal	 punishment,	 death,	 custodial	 sentence,	
imprisonment,	 affects	 all	 men	 to	 an	 equal	 or	 similar	 extent,	 a	 pecuniary	
punishment	 is	 the	 most	 unequal	 that	 can	 be	 conceived,	 when	 it	 is	 applied	 in	
identical	measures	to	two	persons	of	different	wealth.	(Pacheco	1856:	414‐415)	
	
Admittedly,	 some	 scholars	 argued	 that	 the	 law	 was	 equal	 for	 all	 when	 the	 same	 amount	 of	
money	was	set	to	be	paid,	regardless	of	the	offender’s	class	or	socio‐economic	status	(Carrara	
1871).	But	even	from	a	formal	perspective	this	argument	could	not	be	upheld.	Imprisonment,	it	
was	argued,	could	be	applied	with	more	equal	 force	than	fines	to	those	with	means	and	those	
without.	Moreover,	it	could	be	done	without	directly	affecting	the	offender’s	family,	unlike	fines.	
Therefore,	 fine	 supporters	 usually	 limited	 its	 use	 to	 less	 severe	 crimes,	 petty	 offences	 and	
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misdemeanours	(Bertola	1893:	553;	Schmölder	1902:	11;	Silvela	1903:	318;	Vila	Miquel	1917:	
163).	 Additionally,	 fines	 were	 viewed	 as	 an	 inappropriate	 punishment	 when	 the	 crime	 was	
committed	out	of	necessity,	because	then	they	would	have	criminogenic	effects	(Carrara	1871:	
463;	 Ferri	 1900:	 454;	 Rauh	 1912).	 This	 observation	 had	 already	 been	 put	 forth	 by	
Enlightenment	 thinkers	 like	Beccaria	(1764)	or	Kleinschrod	(1794).	Therefore,	 they	proposed	
to	 avoid	 the	 use	 of	 fines,	 given	 the	 poverty	 of	 those	 who	 committed	 most	 property	 crimes,	
particularly	theft.		
	
A	second	explanation	of	the	relegation	of	the	fine	to	a	comparatively	minor	role	in	the	criminal	
justice	 system	was	 the	 problem	 of	 imprisonment	 for	 fine	 defaulters.	 If	 the	 fine	 could	 not	 be	
effectively	applied	because	of	the	offenders’	insolvency,	this	automatically	led	to	imprisonment	
as	its	substitution.3	The	need	to	emphatically	reinforce	the	obligation	to	pay	a	fine	very	quickly	
led	to	prison	sentences	being	handed	down	as	a	substitute	sanction	for	cases	of	non‐payment.	
Prisons	were	being	filled	with	people	who	had	originally	been	sentenced	to	pay	a	fine	precisely	
because	they	were	not	considered	to	deserve	imprisonment.	This	was	a	commonly	recognised	
effect	in	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century,	and	was	still	an	issue	in	the	first	third	of	the	
twentieth	 century	 (Conti	 1910:	 457;	 Stooβ	 1907:	 243;	 Thoday	 1934:	 30).	 This	 problem	 of	
imprisonment	in	default	of	payment	became	a	central	 issue	in	criminal	 justice.	During	the	late	
nineteenth‐century	 crusade	 against	 short‐term	 imprisonment,	 the	 deprivation	 of	 freedom	 for	
non‐payment	of	fines,	usually	a	short‐term	sentence,	began	to	be	rejected	as	counterproductive.		
	
There	was	some	experimentation	with	ways	to	manage	the	problem.	A	significant	attempt	was	
made	 to	 limit	 imprisonment	 for	 fine	default	 to	 cases	where	 the	offender	did	not	pay	 the	 fine	
‘wilfully,	 through	 laziness,	 licentiousness,	or	negligence’	(Swiss	Project	 for	a	Penal	Code	1918,	
art.	 46).	 This	 proposal,	 despite	 being	 supported	 by	many	 socio‐legal	 scholars	 (Florian	 1934:	
807;	Garofalo	1887:	105,	Stooβ	1907:	245),	was	not	embodied	in	legislation	or	failed	to	reduce	
imprisonment,4	as	its	 inevitable	consequence	was	the	 impossibility	of	 imposing	fines	on	those	
who	were	unable	to	pay.5	This,	 in	turn,	was	thought	to	 lead	to	recidivism	(Heüman	1938:	549	
ff.).	 To	avoid	 the	poor	becoming	unpunishable,	 a	 compromise	was	 reached	which	 established	
strict	 sentencing	 limits	 in	 order	 to	 restrict	 imprisonment	 time	 for	 non‐payment.6	 The	
justification	for	this	regulation	was	that,	if	no	time	limit	was	set,	‘the	punishment	would	be	very	
disproportionate	to	the	offence’,	and	it	was	advisable	to	establish	imprisonment	for	fine	default	
‘within	 certain	 limits	 based	 on	 fairness	 that	 had	 been	 neglected’	 (de	 Vizmanos	 and	 Álvarez	
Martínez	 1848:	 270).	 But	 what	 was	 the	 extent	 of	 this	 disproportion	 if	 the	 conversion	 rate	
between	 money	 and	 time	 was	 considered	 suitable?	 There	 was	 no	 clear	 explanation	 but	
evidently	 it	was	 linked	to	 two	aspects.	First,	 those	who	were	clearly	unable	to	pay	because	of	
their	lack	of	means	should	not	be	treated	in	the	same	way	as	those	who	fraudulently	refused	to	
pay.	And	second,	a	prison	sentence	becomes	harder	the	longer	it	goes	on,	while	the	intensity	of	a	
fine	penalty	does	not	always	increase	with	a	larger	amount,	depending	on	the	financial	situation	
of	the	offender.	Depriving	the	offender	of	an	amount	he	or	she	needed	to	live	was	not	the	same	
as	depriving	him	or	her	of	something	that	was	superfluous	to	cover	the	most	basic	needs	(see	in	
this	regard	Rossi	1853:	495‐496).		
	
The	 length	 of	 the	prison	 sentence	was	 also	 limited	 in	 the	 case	of	 small	 fines.	 For	 example,	 in	
England,	 for	 fines	 of	 not	 more	 than	 five	 shillings,	 it	 was	 recommended	 that	 imprisonment	
should	be	prohibited	and	detention	for	not	more	than	twenty‐four	hours	in	police	stations	cells	
substituted	(Thoday	1934:	32).		
	
Additionally,	 in	 some	 countries	 it	 was	 considered	 inappropriate	 to	 impose	 imprisonment	 for	
fine	 default	 on	 prisoners	 who	 were	 already	 sentenced	 to	 long‐term	 custodial	 sentences	 (for	
instance,	at	least	four	years	or	more	in	the	Spanish	Penal	Code	1848,	art.	49).		
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The	limited	effect	of	the	measures	mentioned	above	led	to	the	correctionalists’	criticism	against	
short‐term	 prison	 sentences	 being	 broadened,	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century,	 to	
include	 fines.7	This	negative	point	of	 view	made	 it	necessary	 to	propose	either	abolishing	 the	
fine	or	making	significant	amendments	to	its	regulations.	The	key	idea	was	that	calculating	the	
fine	according	to	the	offender’s	financial	situation	would	no	longer	make	it	necessary	to	impose	
prison	sentences	for	non‐payment.	Hence,	this	determination	of	the	fine	was	explicitly	geared	to	
reducing	the	problem	of	overcrowded	prisons	and	unnecessary	short‐term	imprisonment	but,	
as	 we	 will	 see,	 it	 was	 also	 justified	 by	 arguments	 based	 on	 equalising	 the	 impact	 of	 fines	
(Glauning	1905;	Goldschmidt	1908:	408‐409;	Stooβ	1907;	von	Liszt	1889a:	45).	A	new	concept	
of	 equality,	 different	 from	 the	 one	 accepted	 during	 the	 Enlightenment,	 had	 to	 be	 taken	 into	
account.	
	
Taking	into	account	the	wealth	of	the	offender	
Legislation	of	the	ancien	régime	admitted	the	clause	of	determining	the	amount	of	the	fine	based	
on	the	greater	or	lesser	wealth	of	the	offender,8	and	the	same	approach	can	be	seen	in	some	of	
the	first	European	criminal	codes.9	In	The	Rationale	of	Punishment,	Bentham	(1811)	had	already	
pointed	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 fine	 taking	 into	 account	 ‘the	 fortune	 of	 the	
offender’	as	well	as	the	profit	of	the	offence,	the	value	of	the	thing	which	is	the	subject	matter	of	
the	 offence,	 and	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 injury.	 Specifically,	 he	 stated	 that,	 in	 order	 to	 guarantee	
equality	of	impact,	the	most	appropriate	way	of	proceeding	was	to	establish	a	percentage	of	the	
offender’s	wealth	(1811:	Chapter	IV,	Section	II.3).	His	was	a	minority	viewpoint	 in	continental	
Europe,	where	two	arguments	supported	the	fact	that	the	offender’s	financial	situation	was	not	
to	be	taken	into	account	when	fixing	the	amount	of	the	fine.		
	
The	first	argument,	the	establishment	of	fixed	penalties	that	did	not	leave	courts	much	latitude,	
was	aimed	at	combatting	the	arbitrariness	of	the	ancien	régime.	 It	was	the	clear	wish	that	 the	
fine	did	not	become	a	type	of	general	confiscation	of	the	offender’s	assets,	a	measure	that	had	
been	 abused	 during	 the	 ancien	 régime	 and	 which,	 after	 the	 Enlightened	 criticisms	 (Beccaria	
1764:	Chapter	XXV;	Voltaire’s	Commentaries:	Chapter	21;	von	Feuerbach	1804:	163‐164)	was	
forbidden	in	the	first	Constitutions.10	The	need	to	break	away	from	the	ancien	régime	also	bore	
some	 relation	 with	 the	 wish	 to	 prevent	 the	 courts	 from	 having	 to	 investigate	 thoroughly	 to	
determine	what	the	offender	possessed,	as	this	procedure	had	inquisitorial	overtones	(Aurioles	
Montero	1849:	95‐96;	Rossi	1853:	496).	
	
Secondly,	 the	 principle	 of	 equality,	 stated	 in	 the	 first	 Constitutions,	 was	 understood	 to	 be	 a	
formal	 equality	 in	 terms	 of	 rights	 and	 obligations	 and	 in	 rewards	 and	 punishments,	 which	
prevented	or	advised	against	establishing	differences	based	on	the	wealth	of	offenders.11	This	
reaction	was	understandable	given	that	the	fine	had	been	used	as	a	privilege	of	the	rich	during	
the	 previous	 centuries.	 But	 what	 was	 considered	 at	 the	 time	 to	 be	 a	 manifestation	 of	 the	
principle	 of	 equality	 –	 that	 punishments	 were	 imposed	 on	 everyone	 to	 the	 same	 extent	 –	
appeared	at	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century	as	a	manifestation	of	inequality.12	It	was	reasoned	
that	 equality	 can	pull	 in	 two	directions:	 on	 the	 one	hand,	 towards	 the	 achievement	 of	 formal	
equality	 related	 to	 the	 seriousness	 of	 the	 crime;	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 towards	 material	
equality	related	to	the	offender’s	level	of	income.	As	we	will	see,	one	followed	the	other	during	
the	transition	into	the	twentieth	century.		
	
In	practice,	this	viewpoint	led	to	the	belief	that	it	was	unfair	to	determine	the	amount	of	the	fine	
based	on	the	financial	capacity	of	the	offender,	because	the	amount	set	for	the	fine	would	not	be	
proportionate	 to	 the	 seriousness	 of	 the	 offence	 but	 rather	 would	 depend	 on	 external	
circumstances	 (Carrara	1871:	464‐465).	From	 the	perspective	of	 the	 internal	 structure	of	 the	
theory	of	crime	and	punishment,	Germany’s	Merkel	(1893:	351)	and	Berolzheimer	(1907:	255)	
saw	no	 sense	 in	 taking	 the	offender’s	 financial	 circumstances	 into	 account	when	determining	
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the	punishment	 as	 these	bore	no	 relation	whatsoever	 to	 the	 level	 of	 culpability.	They	 argued	
that	 the	 solvent	 offender	was	 richer,	 not	 guiltier,	 and	what	 should,	 in	 general,	 be	 considered	
positively	must	not	be	turned	into	a	disadvantage	in	the	penal	domain.	Arguments	were	lodged	
against	 this	 objection	 stating	 that,	when	 determining	 the	 punishment,	 the	 level	 of	 culpability	
should	be	considered	as	well	as	the	type	of	punishment	that	should	be	 imposed.	The	key	idea	
was	that	culpability,	as	an	element	of	the	crime	related	to	retribution,	cannot	be	considered	in	a	
purely	objective	manner	and	limited	to	the	criminal	act,	but	rather	its	subjective	aspect	must	be	
taken	 into	 account	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 suffering	 inflicted	must	be	 truly	 felt	 by	 the	offender.	
Therefore,	the	attention	paid	to	the	offender’s	financial	capacity	was	not	incompatible	with	the	
basis	 used	 for	 determining	 the	 punishment	 (Goldschmidt	 1908:	 402‐403;	 Rauh	 1912:	 32;	
Thyrén	1910:	74).	And	there	was	no	shortage	of	defenders	of	 the	 idea	 that	 the	rich	man	who	
committed	a	crime	was,	 in	 fact,	 guiltier,	because	he	has	greater	means	and	abilities	 to	uphold	
the	law	than	the	person	who	does	it	while	deprived	of	resources	(Bonneville	de	Marsangy	1864:	
289;	Vila	Miquel	1917:	143).	
	
In	 spite	 of	 these	 negative	 opinions,	 the	 problem	 of	 imprisonment	 for	 fine	 defaulters	made	 it	
necessary	 to	 propose	 either	 abolishing	 the	 fine	 or	 introducing	 significant	 innovations	 to	 deal	
with	the	problem	of	defaulters	(Seagle	1948:	250‐252).	
	
The	problem	of	determining	the	offender’s	economic	situation	
The	 progressive	 confluence	 of	 opinions	 regarding	 the	 need	 to	 take	 the	 offender’s	 financial	
situation	into	account	did	not	spread	to	other	relevant	aspects	of	the	fine,	such	as	the	concepts	
that	had	to	be	considered	when	determining	 the	offender’s	 financial	 capacity.	For	example,	 in	
most	common‐law	countries,	there	was	a	rather	casual	approach	to	performing	the	calculations,	
‘usually	 involving	no	more	 than	a	probation	officer’s	or	a	 social	worker’s	 report	and	 thus	not	
significantly	slowing	the	administrative	pace	of	the	summary	justice	machine’	(O’Malley	2009:	
53).	 But	 in	 continental	 Europe	 discussions	 arose	 about	 whether	 income	 or	 assets	 should	 be	
taken	 into	 account	 when	 determining	 the	 fine.	 The	 viewpoint	 of	 the	 growing	 industrial	 and	
commercial	bourgeoisie,	concerned	about	holding	on	to	their	wealth,	was	that	the	fine	should	be	
determined	 in	 accordance	 with	 income,	 as	 a	 guarantee	 against	 the	 confiscation	 of	 assets	
(Aurioles	Montero	 1849:	96;	 de	Vizmanos	 and	Álvarez	Martínez	 1848:	 306‐307;	Goldschmidt	
1908:	403;	Rossi	1853:	274‐275;	Wahlberg	1875:	262).	The	spread	of	salaried	work	also	tipped	
the	balance	in	favour	of	income,	which	was	relevant	to	a	growing	number	of	people,	instead	of	
assets,	 which	 only	 concerned	 a	 fairly	 small	 sector	 of	 the	 population,	 as	 highlighted	 by	 von	
Lilienthal	(1892:	80)	who	considered	assets	as	a	subsidiary	criterion.		
	
But	it	was	one	thing	to	say	that	the	fine	should	be	in	line	with	the	offender’s	income	and	another	
thing	to	determine	what	this	income	was.	The	concern	for	avoiding	state	intrusion	into	citizens’	
financial	 affairs	 led	 to	 the	 proposal	 that	 only	 known,	 manifest	 or	 officially	 certified	 income	
(Lammasch	1891:	232;	Wahlberg	1872:	136),	the	annually	paid	income	tax	(Goldschmidt	1908:	
402;	Rosenfeld	1892:	187;	Runkel‐Langsdorff	 1908:	43;	 von	Liszt	 1889a:	45),	 or	 census	data,	
which	listed	the	people	obliged	to	pay	tax	(Mittelstädt	1891:	63),	should	be	taken	into	account.	
In	 countries	with	a	 less	developed	 tax	system,	 such	as	Spain,	 it	was	proposed	 that	disposable	
income	would	be	certified	by	 the	mayor	and	 four	dignitaries	 (Vila	Miquel	1917:	146).	All	 this	
was	 aimed	 at	 avoiding	 enquiries	 into	 ‘family	 secrets’,	 or	 adding	 ‘upheaval	 or	 indignity	 to	 the	
fine’	(de	Vizmanos	and	Álvarez	Martínez	1848:	307;	also	see	Rossi	1853:	496),	based	on	the	fact	
that:		
	
…	 [o]ur	 ideas	 do	 not	 allow	 for	 an	 inquisition	 into	 the	 possessions	 of	 each	
individual.	The	courts,	on	the	other	hand,	would	attempt	this	in	vain.	This	cannot,	
and	must	not,	happen.	(Pacheco	1856:	415)		
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Other	proposals	focussing	on	establishing	the	fine	based	on	the	income	declared	by	the	offender	
did	 not	 prosper.	 They	 tried	 to	 incorporate	 concepts	 which	 had	 been	 designed	 primarily	 for	
those	who	 had	money	 and	would	most	 likely	 be	 affected	 by	 tax	 law,	with	 other	 ideas	which	
considered	 in	 particular	 people	 belonging	 to	 the	 poorer	 classes	 who	 were	more	 likely	 to	 be	
subjected	to	criminal	law	alone	(Roldán	Barbero	1983:	31).	Taxes	were	not	comparable	to	fines,	
although	the	sums	of	both	were	received	by	the	State.	As	von	Buri	(1878:	242)	said:		
	
…	 the	exclusive	essence	of	 the	 fine	 is	 that	 the	offender	experiences,	 through	 its	
enforcement,	 a	 reduction	 of	 his	 wealth,	 that	 makes	 him	 poorer	 than	 he	 was	
previously.	That	a	third	party,	especially	the	State,	should	accrete	an	asset	upon	
payment	of	 the	 fine	 is,	 in	contrast,	merely	secondary.	The	money	received	from	
the	offender	could	be	appropriated,	destroyed	or	thrown	away,	and	the	essence	
of	the	fine	would	still	be	intact.	
	
However,	 beyond	 these	differences,	 in	 proposals	 to	base	 the	 amount	of	 the	 fine	on	 taxes,	 the	
need	to	rationalise	the	calculation	system	and	make	it	more	predictable	was	a	cause	of	concern	
for	some.	This	was	opposed	by	those	who	believed	that	it	was	not	the	remit	of	criminal	law	to	
undertake	financial	investigations	(for	example,	Stooβ	1907:	243).	
	
The	initial	proposals	regarding	the	proportion	of	the	offender’s	income	were	quite	demanding.	
For	example,	Garofalo	(1887:	106‐108)	understood	that,	when	dealing	with	solvent	offenders,	it	
was	 appropriate	 to	 take	 the	 proportion	 of	 their	 income	 that	 exceeded	 what	 was	 absolutely	
essential	to	cover	their	basic	living	needs	for	board	and	lodging.	These	needs	were	calculated	as	
what	was	strictly	necessary	to	avoid	starving,	without	the	slightest	consideration	given	to	their	
social	status	and	their	accustomed	lifestyle.	However,	opinions	were	soon	expressed	regarding	
the	 need	 to	 consider	 not	 only	 family	 duties	 but	 also	 the	 difference	 between	 what	 was	
superfluous	 and	 what	 was	 necessary,	 because	 ‘a	 quarter	 of	 the	 daily	 income	 of	 a	 well‐to‐do	
gentleman	 is	 not	 the	 same	 proportion,	 although	 it	may	 seem	 to	 be,	 as	 a	 quarter	 of	 the	 daily	
income	of	a	manual	worker’	(de	Vizmanos	and	Álvarez	Martínez	1848:	307,	quoting	Bentham	to	
support	 this	 view).	 This	 concern,	 widespread	 in	 European	 literature,13	 foreshadowed	 the	
establishment	of	 the	 fine	as	a	penalty	 that	deprived	offenders	of	 income	 that	was	not	 strictly	
necessary	 for	 their	 personal	 maintenance	 and	 family	 duties;	 in	 other	 words,	 a	 penalty	 that	
deprived	 them	 of	 the	 excess	 that	 they	 could	 otherwise	 spend	 on	 consumption	 or	 leisure	 (as	
formulated	by	Bauman	1968:	71).		
	
The	difficulties	inherent	in	determining	the	financial	situation	of	the	offender	led	to	some	penal	
codes	 initially	 adopting	 detailed	 formulas.	 These	 were	 gradually	 simplified	 until	 they	 were	
merely	programmatic	declarations,	and	without	actually	having	determined	how	they	should	be	
specified	 in	 judicial	practice.	Others	experienced	oscillating	progress	regarding	 this	 issue.	The	
fact	 is	 that,	 in	 the	 judicial	 practice	 of	 the	 European	 countries	 considered	 here,	 the	 general	
tendency	was	not	 to	make	 too	many	enquiries	 into	 the	offender’s	 level	 of	 income,	 essentially	
relying	 solely	 on	 information	 from	 the	 defendant	 and	 his	 or	 her	 counsel.	 The	 high	 degree	 of	
confidence	 given	 to	 this	 self‐reported	 information	 from	 average	 offenders	 was	 mostly	
supported	by	scarce	verification	efforts.	It	would	have	been	possible,	however,	for	the	courts	to	
have	a	great	deal	more	information	and	without	major	structural	reforms,	if	they	had	asked	for	
it.	 They	did	not,	however,	mostly	because	 they	 lacked	 the	 time	 to	do	 so.	Nevertheless,	 courts	
were	 less	 confident	 about	 the	 accuracy	 of	 reports	 received	 from	 higher‐income	 offenders,	 in	
which	case	they	tended	to	use	what	they	knew	about	the	offender,	including	information	about	
his	or	her	residence,	occupation,	number	of	children,	and	so	on.	This	method	of	proceeding	still	
goes	 on	 today,	 despite	 the	 enormous	 possibilities	 of	 crosschecking	 data	 offered	 by	 computer	
systems.	
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No	solution	was	found	for	the	cases	of	people	with	no	income.	In	these	situations,	only	working	
in	prison	or	in	public	works	was	considered	acceptable,	with	a	minority	asking	for	the	remission	
of	the	penalty	(Stooβ	1907:	246).	
	
The	route	towards	the	day	fine	
It	should	be	noted	that	the	need	to	consider	the	offender’s	financial	situation	to	determine	the	
end	 amount	 of	 the	 fine	 concurred	with	 other	 factors	 that	 should	 also	 be	 taken	 into	 account.	
These	 included,	 in	 particular,	 the	 severity	 of	 the	 offence	 and	 the	 blameworthiness	 of	 the	
perpetrator.	Only	with	the	day‐fine	system	did	the	offender’s	ability	to	pay	the	fine	become	the	
one	and	only	aspect	considered	when	setting	the	monetary	value	for	the	fine	units	–	each	unit	
was	 one	 ‘day’	 –	 while	 the	 number	 of	 these	 units	 was	 selected	 according	 to	 the	 degree	 of	
punishment	appropriate	for	the	specific	criminal	behaviour.	In	essence,	‘…	the	basis	of	the	day‐
fine	system	 is	 the	 two‐stage	breakdown	of	 the	determination	method’	 (Roldán	Barbero	1983:	
45).	
	
In	fact,	the	need	to	take	the	offender’s	financial	situation	into	account	does	not,	per	se,	define	the	
day‐fine	 system.	 Rather,	 it	 is	 one	 of	 the	 methods	 of	 the	 so‐called	 fine	 total	 amount	 system	
(‘Gesamtsummensystem’),	 where	 the	 judge	 imposes	 a	 specific	 amount,	 essentially	 the	
combination	of	two	coordinates:	the	severity	of	the	offence	and	the	offender’s	financial	situation	
(Beristain	 Ipiña	 1976:	 31).	 These	 two	 coordinates	 eventually	 became	 three	 with	 the	
blameworthiness	 of	 the	 perpetrator	 added	 once	 the	 imperative	 for	 justice	 to	 express	 the	
offender’s	 level	 of	 culpability	 in	 the	 sentence	 was	 rationalised	 (Mittelbach	 1957:	 1139).	 But	
there	was	still	a	long	way	to	go	to	establish	the	day‐fine	system.	
	
The	first	doctrinal	formulations	of	the	day‐fine	system,	defined	in	terms	of	the	need	to	break	the	
determination	 process	 of	 the	 fine	 down	 into	 two	 elements,	 are	 found	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	
nineteenth	 century,	 almost	 simultaneously	 in	 Germany	 (Friedmann	 1892:	 148,	 followed	 by	
Merkel	1893:	351	ff.)	and	Italy	(Bertola	1895:	10,	12).14	They	shared	the	idea	of	adopting	a	term	
of	imprisonment	as	the	basic	measure	of	the	fine;	in	other	words,	as	a	means	of	determining	the	
duration	 of	 the	 penalty.	 Then,	 using	 a	 conversion	 method	 based	 on	 the	 offender’s	 financial	
situation,	 each	 day	 of	 the	 penalty	 could	 be	 replaced	with	 a	 specific	 amount	 of	money.	 These	
proposals,	although	based	on	a	term	of	imprisonment	–	which,	to	a	certain	extent,	blurred	the	
autonomy	of	 the	 fine	penalty	 (Grebing	1978:	75)	–	should,	nevertheless,	be	considered	as	 the	
first	doctrinal	formulations	of	the	day‐fine	system	(Driendl	1978:	19,	39;	Roldán	Barbero	1983:	
44‐45).	In	fact,	they	occurred	several	years	prior	to	the	proposal	made	by	the	Swedish	Thyrén	
(1910),	who	many	mistakenly	 took	 to	be	 the	creator	of	 this	 system	(see,	 for	example,	Florian	
1934:	 807;	 Hillsman	 et	 al.	 1984:	 16).	 The	 day‐fine	 system	 was,	 however,	 first	 introduced	 in	
Finland	 in	 1921,	 then	 in	 Sweden	 in	 1931,	 followed	 by	 Denmark	 in	 1939,	 which	 is	 why	 it	 is	
known	 today	as	 the	 ‘Scandinavian	 system’.	 From	 there	 it	 spread	 to	other	European	 countries	
(Austria,	France,	Germany,	Greece,	Portugal,	Spain,	and	so	on).	
	
In	 the	modern	 day‐fine	 system,	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 fine	 is	 established	 in	 two	 stages.	 The	 first	
involves	 setting	 the	 number	 of	 sentencing	 days	 to	 be	 imposed,	 taking	 into	 account	 the	
seriousness	 of	 the	 offence	 and	 without	 regard	 for	 the	 offender’s	 financial	 situation.	 In	 the	
second	 stage,	 the	monetary	 value	 to	 be	 paid	 for	 each	 day	 of	 sentencing	 is	 set	 in	 light	 of	 the	
financial	circumstances.	The	question	of	how	to	translate	day‐fines	into	prison	terms	in	case	of	
fine	default	is	answered	in	a	very	efficient	way	that	avoids	the	creation	of	differences	between	
diverse	income	groups,	as	feared	by	Mittelbach	(1957:	1139):	one,	two,	or	three	temporal	units	
of	 the	 fine	 converts	 to	one	day	 in	prison.	 In	 this	way,	 there	 are	no	differences	 in	 the	penalty	
between	income	groups	of	offenders	because	the	number	of	days	in	the	day‐fine	system	is	fixed	
according	to	the	seriousness	of	crime.	In	other	words,	the	penalty	would	be	the	same	for	a	poor	
and	a	rich	offender	convicted	of	the	same	crime.	Thus,	the	system	does	not	offend	the	principle	
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of	proportionality	between	crime	and	punishment,	or	the	principle	of	equality	between	rich	and	
poor	offenders.	By	using	the	day‐fine	system,	the	fine	obtained	is	proportionate	to	the	offence	
with	 this	 proportion	 expressed	 in	 temporal	 units	 –	 days	 or	 months	 –	 and	 reflective	 of	 the	
offender’s	means	with	this	reflection	expressed	in	monetary	terms	with	a	certain	sum	to	be	paid	
for	each	day.		
	
Conclusion	
In	summary,	from	the	end	of	the	eighteenth	century	and	throughout	the	nineteenth	century,	we	
saw	the	infiltration	of	a	key	idea	which	directed	the	development	process	of	the	fine.	This	was	
that	the	amount	of	the	fine	must	be	calculated	so	that	it	leaves	the	offender	the	necessary	means	
of	support15	but	‘excluding	the	amount	that	serves	to	satisfy	pleasures,	whatever	these	may	be,	
such	as	wine,	spirits	and	tobacco’	(Garofalo	1887:	108;	see	Vila	Miquel	1917:	150,	161).	Then,	in	
the	 second	 half	 of	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 discussions	 arose	 about	whether	 it	was	 a	matter	 of	
depriving	 the	 offender	 of	 the	 whole	 amount	 that	 was	 not	 strictly	 necessary	 to	 cover	 the	
essentials,	 as	 proposed	 by	 Bauman	 (1968:	 71)	 and	 Zipf	 (1974:	 513	 ff.).	 Subsequently,	 the	
amount	of	an	offender’s	daily	wage	was	proposed	as	the	maximum	fine.	 In	some	penal	codes,	
this	amount	was	the	officially	recognised	minimum	wage	but	this	was	not	necessarily	a	measure	
of	the	offender’s	income.	But	that	is	another	story	to	be	told	at	another	time.	
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1	References	used	are	not	only	in	English,	but	predominantly	in	German,	Italian,	and	Spanish.	My	purpose	is	to	make	
the	huge	 ‘non‐English‐speaking’	 literature	about	the	penal	 fine	known	to	the	Anglophone	academic	world,	where	
the	small	amount	of	attention	sociologists	of	punishment	and	social	control,	legal	scholars,	and	criminologists	give	
to	the	role	of	money	and	fines	in	the	criminal	system	is	extremely	surprising	(as	indicated	by	Bottoms	1983:	168;	
Young	1989:	47;	O’Malley	2009).	In	contrast,	the	quantity	and	quality	of	works	relating	to	the	penal	fine	in	Germany	
is	 amazing.	 They	 also	 cover	 the	 entire	 codification	 period	 to	 the	 present,	 and	 the	 perspective	 taken	 is,	 in	many	
cases,	historical.	This	intense	attention	devoted	to	the	fine	was	well	known	in	the	countries	of	its	area	of	influence:	
not	only	in	German‐speaking	countries	as	one	would	expect	(Austria	and	Switzerland)	but	also	those	that	received	
a	strong	influence	of	German	law	at	various	times	in	their	academic	history:	basically	Spain	and	Italy.	However,	 I	
will	make	no	attempt	to	systematically	compare	these	countries.	They	shared	much	with,	but	also	differed	greatly	
from,	each	other.	I	will	refer	to	their	experiences	and	developments	only	when	sources	allow	and	as	appropriate	for	
the	advancement	of	my	argument.		
2	Soon	it	was	also	clear	that	the	same	fine	amount	for	all	offenders	sentenced	for	the	same	crime	made	the	punitive	
impact	of	 fine	sentences	comparatively	 less	 for	more	affluent	offenders,	since	 these	systems	tend	to	depress	 fine	
amounts	 to	adapt	 them	to	 the	 lowest	common	economic	denominator	of	offenders	 in	one	determined	country,	a	
problem	already	identified	by	writers	and	thinkers	across	Europe	(Filangieri	1788:	Book	III,	second	part,	Chapter	
XXXII;	Carrara	1871:	464;	Gutmann	1909:	127‐128).	
3	The	numbers	of	people	in	prison	for	the	non‐payment	of	fines	were	very	different	from	one	country	to	other,	but	
large	 by	 any	 standard.	 For	 example,	 in	 Spain	 it	 was	 argued	 that,	 in	 ninety	 per	 cent	 of	 sentences,	 the	 fine	 was	
misleading	 because	 the	 offender	 then	 proceeded	 to	 declare	 himself	 insolvent	 (Armengol	 Cornet	 1894:	 57).	 In	
Switzerland	Stooβ	 (1907:	243;	1916:	2‐3)	 stated	 that	 there	were	more	people	 in	 prison	 for	 the	non‐payment	of	
fines	 than	 people	 who	 had	 originally	 received	 a	 custodial	 sentence,	 offering	 statistical	 data	 that	 confirmed	 this	
observation.	In	Italy	it	was	well	known	that	the	pecuniary	punishments	were	imposed	only	pro	forma	on	the	poor,	
since	in	reality	 they	turned	into	prison	sentences	as	the	fines	 inevitably	remained	unpaid	(Florian	1934:	807).	 In	
Germany	 von	 Liszt	 (1889b:	 742)	 also	 stated	 that,	 in	 the	majority	 of	 cases,	 the	 fine	 became	 a	 short‐term	 prison	
sentence	due	to	non‐payment,	despite	the	fact	that	there	are	no	data	on	this	matter	in	the	imperial	statistics.	It	was	
simply	 stated	 in	 1884	 that	 the	 fines	 that	 became	 prison	 sentences	 made	 up	 a	 ‘not	 insignificant’	 percentage	
(Kriminalstatistik	 1884:	 14).	 According	 to	 a	 study	 concerning	 the	 situation	 of	 the	Grand	Duchy	 of	Württemberg	
between	the	years	1888	and	1892,	approximately	34	per	cent	of	the	fines	handed	out	turned	into	prison	sentences	
or	were	recorded	as	bad	debts,	41	per	cent	were	paid	and	25	per	cent	were	immediately	substituted	because	of	the	
offender’s	insolvency	(Rettich	1894:	507).		
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4	 For	 example,	 the	 English	 Rating	 and	 Evaluation	 Act	 1925,	which	 provided	 that	 a	 defaulter	who	 proved	 that	 his	
failure	to	pay	was	due	to	circumstances	beyond	his	control	should	not	be	imprisoned,	had	no	effect	at	all	(Thoday	
1937:	389).	
5	As	acknowledged	in	some	of	the	first	enlightened	criminal	codes.	For	example,	the	Prussian	Allgemeines	Landrecht	
1794,	§	85,	which	provided	that	‘fines	cannot	be	imposed	on	persons	without	means	of	the	lower	classes’,	and	that	
they	should	be	replaced	with	a	proportionate	prison	or	labour	sentence.		
6	For	example,	two	months	for	regulatory	offences	in	the	Tuscany	Penal	Code	1853	(which	did	not	allow	substitution	
for	imprisonment	in	case	of	criminal	offences);	two	years	for	criminal	offences	in	the	Spanish	Penal	Codes	1822	and	
1848	and	the	Sardinian	Penal	Code	1859;	four	years	in	the	Prussian	Penal	Code	1851;	one	year	for	crimes	and	six	
weeks	 for	 misdemeanours	 in	 the	 German	 Imperial	 Penal	 Code	 1871;	 and	 four	 years	 of	 ‘reclusione’	 or	 three	 of	
‘arresto’	in	the	Italian	Rocco	Penal	Code	1930.	
7	For	example,	in	Spain	the	authors,	influenced	by	correctionalist	approaches	but	also	by	the	socio‐economic	reality,	
adopted	 viewpoints	 that	 were	 completely	 unfavourable	 towards	 pecuniary	 punishments	 (Vida	 1885:	 58,	 68;	
Armengol	Cornet	1894:	57;	Bernaldo	de	Quirós	1898:	306;	Bernaldo	de	Quirós	and	Navarro	de	Palencia	1911:	598)	
or,	 at	 the	 very	most,	 they	 expressed	 resigned	 acceptance	 considering	 them	 the	 lesser	 of	 two	 evils	 compared	 to	
short‐term	prison	sentences	(Arenal	1890:	321),	with	some	notable	exceptions	(Silvela	1874:	318).	In	Italy	it	was	
also	emphasised	that,	given	the	situation	affecting	a	large	part	of	the	population	trapped	in	the	most	abject	poverty,	
the	fine	was	a	penalty	that	should	be	abolished,	since	in	reality	it	automatically	turned	into	a	prison	sentence.	This	
was	a	situation	that	Ciccarelli	(1897:	655)	described	as	an	‘iniquity’,	nothing	more	than	a	‘punishment	of	poverty’.	
The	same	view	was	upheld	in	Switzerland,	where	Stooβ	(1916:	5	ff.)	spoke	of	the	fine	as	a	‘privilege	of	the	rich’;	and	
also	 in	 Germany,	 where	 Merkel	 (1895:	 387)	 pointed	 out	 that	 imprisonment	 for	 fine	 defaulters	 gave	 the	
administration	 of	 justice	 the	 nature	 of	 a	 justice	 of	 classes,	 since	 the	 rich	man	 pays,	 while	 the	 poor	 one	 goes	 to	
prison.	
8	For	example,	in	Spain,	Law	I,	title	I,	book	XII	of	the	Fuero	Juzgo,	a	codex	of	Spanish	laws	enacted	by	Fernando	III	of	
Castile	 in	1241;	and	more	recently,	Law	VIII,	 title	31,	Partida	VII	of	the	Siete	Partidas	or	Seven‐Part	Code	1348,	a	
Castilian	statutory	code	first	compiled	during	the	reign	of	Alfonso	X	of	Castile.	
9	 For	 example,	 the	 Austrian	 Penal	 Codes	 1803,	 §	 23,	 and	 1852,	 §	 260,	 or	 the	 Penal	 Code	 for	 the	 Kingdom	 of	
Wurttemberg	1839,	art.	32.	
10See	 the	Austrian	Criminal	Code	1803;	 the	Penal	Law	Code	 for	 the	Kingdom	of	Bavaria	1813,	art.	33;	 the	Spanish	
Constitution	 1812,	 art.	 304;	 and	 the	 French	Charte	Constitutionnelle	 1814,	 art.	 66.	 In	 Italy	 it	was	 suppressed	 by	
Carlo	Alberto	in	1831	–	art.	5	of	the	Regie	patenti	19	May	1831	–	following	the	precedents	of	the	penal	codes	of	the	
Kingdom	of	the	Two	Sicilies	1819	and	of	the	Kingdom	of	Parma	1820,	in	which	it	no	longer	appeared.		
11So,	 for	 example,	 in	 Spain,	with	 regard	 to	 the	 general	demand	 to	not	make	distinctions	when	 imposing	penalties,	
Calatrava,	one	of	the	main	writers	of	the	Spanish	Penal	Code	1822,	said	during	the	pre‐legislative	discussions:	
For	me	 legal	 equality	means	 that	 a	 Spaniard	 of	 any	 class,	who	 commits	 an	 offence	 the	 same	 as	 one	
committed	by	 another	Spaniard	of	 a	different	 class,	 is	 subject	 to	 the	 same	punishment	…	This	 is	 the	
equality	of	the	Constitution,	and	I	believe	that	it	 is	also	in	 line	with	the	principles	of	good	legislation.	
(Diario	de	 las	Sesiones	de	Cortes.	Congreso,	 legislature	of	22	September	1821	to	14	February	1822,	n°	
60,	926)		
In	Germany,	in	turn,	there	was	also	some	resistance	to	measuring	wealth	in	order	to	determine	the	amount	of	the	
fine,	based	on	the	grounds	that	‘to	justify	this	we	need	a	new	definition	of	the	concept	of	“Justice”;	otherwise	we	run	
the	 risk	 of	 confusing	 this	 concept	with	 the	 levelling	 activity	 that	 believes	 it	 right	 to	 impose	 as	many	 charges	 as	
possible	on	the	rich	until	they	are	all	at	the	same	level	as	the	have‐nots’	(Stenglein	1892:	273;	s.	also	Appelius	1891:	
52,	Berolzheimer	1907:	255,	and	Heilborn	1908:	53‐54).	All	of	them	had	forgotten	Bentham’s	opinion:		
The	same	punishments	for	the	same	offences,	is	often	said.	This	adage	has	an	appearance	of	justice	and	
impartiality,	which	seduces	superficial	minds.	To	give	it	a	reasonable	meaning,	it	would	be	necessary	to	
determine	beforehand	what	 is	meant	by	 the	 same	punishments	 and	 the	 same	offences.	An	 inflexible	
law	 ‐	 a	 law	which	 should	 regard	 neither	 sex,	 nor	 age,	 nor	 fortune,	 nor	 rank,	 nor	 education,	 nor	 the	
moral	 nor	 religious	 prejudices	 of	 individuals	 ‐	 would	 be	 doubly	 vicious,	 as	 inefficacious,	 or	 as	
tyrannical.	Too	severe	 for	 some,	 too	 lenient	 for	others;	always	sinning	by	excess	or	defect;	under	an	
appearance	of	equality,	it	would	hide	the	most	monstrous	inequality.	(Bentham	1789:	Chapter	VI)	
12The	 issue	 of	 the	 inequality	 of	 imposing	 the	 same	 amount	 of	 fine	 on	 the	 rich	 and	 the	 poor	 is	 assessed	 by	 all	 the	
European	penal	literature	from	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century	(Puccioni	1855:	204‐205;	Viada	y	Vilaseca	
1890:	 467;	 Bertola	 1893:	 549‐550;	 Armengol	 Cornet	 1894:	 56;	 Birkmeyer	 1901:	 1064,	 1067;	 Vila	Miquel	 1917:	
169‐170).	
13In	Germany	Heilborn	(1908:	52‐53)	and	Goldschmidt	(1908:	403);	in	Italy	Rossi	(1853:	494	ff.)	and	Bertola	(1893:	
550),	 for	whom,	 however,	 ‘it	 is	 equally	 distressing	 for	 everyone	 to	 reduce	 the	 source	 of	 their	 own	 satisfaction,	
whatever	 the	 nature	 of	 this	 may	 be’;	 in	 Spain	 García	 Goyena	 and	 Aguirre	 (1852:	 164‐165).	 S.	 in	 general	 the	
conclusions	of	the	7th	International	Penal	and	Penitentiary	Congress	held	in	Budapest	in	1905.	
14It	had	an	important	legislative	precedent	in	the	Brazilian	Penal	Code	1830,	art.	55,	followed	by	the	Portuguese	Penal	
Codes	1852,	art.	41,	and	1886,	art.	67.	In	these	three	codes	the	fine	should	be	proportional	to	the	offender’s	income	
and	calculated	in	temporal	units,	with	a	maximum	of	three	years.	Each	day	the	offender	should	pay	an	amount	of	
money	fixed	between	a	minimum	and	a	maximum.	However,	this	system	lacked	the	two‐stage	design	characteristic	
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of	the	day	fine,	in	which	the	first	step	is	to	fix	a	duration	according	to	the	gravity	of	the	offence	and	the	second	one	
the	daily	amount	of	the	fine	according	to	the	offender’s	income,	as	we	will	see	immediately.		
15Basically	 board	 and	 lodging,	 but	 also	 the	 means	 and	 instruments	 necessary	 to	 carry	 out	 his	 or	 her	 trade	 or	
profession	(Lardizábal	1782:	Chapter	V	§	V.5).	
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